ANTINOMY AND PARADOX IN ST AUGUSTINE’S “CONFESSIONS” AND THE “SHIMMERING CONCEPT” OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

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ABSTRACT
The aim is to show the disintegration of a personality by analyzing the fragment of “Confession” by St Augustine. It allows us to come from the phenomenological description of personality transformation process to means of psychological defense. By solving the questions of love St Augustine uses hidden rhetorical constructions, which reflect his emotional processes in the most adequate way. They should be analyzed and clarified.

The rhetorical aspect of this transformation can be reconstructed from that part of “Confession” where Augustine describes his Carthage impressions. He suffers psychological chaos: he “ran into love”, “loving love”. Augustine finally summarizes these impressions by saying “I loved not yet, yet I loved to love”. Thesis becomes antithesis and that is the circle.

Wittgenstein wrote in “Tractatus Logico-philosophicus” (1922), that “a function cannot be its own argument”. In “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” (1942) Wittgenstein returns to this topic. For the description of this contradiction Wittgenstein proposes a kind of function: “F (F), where F (ξ) = – ξ (ξ)”. It is “a shimmering concept”.

Contradiction is part of logical symbolism, but topologically, the figures of contradictions, which use Augustine and Wittgenstein, are different. They describe a variety of psychological processes.

The figures of contradictions by St Augustine are the paradox in time. The figures of contradictions by L. Wittgenstein are the antinomy in space.

Keywords: structure, transformation, paradox, antinomy.
INTRODUCTION
The psychological aspect of transformation of feelings can be reconstructed from that part of “Confession” where St Augustine describes his Carthage impressions.

“To Carthage I came, where there sang all around me in my ears a cauldron of unholy loves. I loved not yet, yet I loved to love, and out of a deep-seated want, I hated myself for wanting not. I sought what I might love, in love with loving, and safety I hated, and a way without snares. For within me was a famine of that inward food, Thyself, my God; yet, through that famine I was not hungered; but was without all longing for incorruptible sustenance, not because filled therewith, but the more empty, the more I loathed it. For this cause my soul was sickly and full of sores, it miserably cast itself forth, desiring to be scraped by the touch of objects of sense. Yet if these had not a soul, they would not be objects of love. To love then, and to be beloved, was sweet to me; but more, when I obtained to enjoy the person I loved. I defiled, therefore, the spring of friendship with the filth of concupiscence, and I beclouded its brightness with the hell of lustfulness; and thus foul and unseemly, I would fain, through exceeding vanity, be fine and courtly. I fell headlong then into the love wherein I longed to be ensnared. My God, my Mercy, with how much gall didst Thou out of Thy great goodness be-sprinkle for me that sweetness? For I was both beloved, and secretly arrived at the bond of enjoying; and was with joy fettered with sorrow-bringing bonds, that I might be scourged with the iron burning rods of jealousy, and suspicion, and fears, and angers, and quarrels” [1].

He suffers psychological chaos: he “ran into love”, “loving love”. Augustine finally summarizes these impressions by saying: “I haven’t loved yet, I only loved to love”. So, “I love you” is normal expression. It is simple, trivial and primitive. But it is logical. When strengthening the predicate, we come to formula: “I love love you”. But these two phrases are totally different, because the hidden meaning of the second one is denying the first one. If we continue to strengthen it we come to formula “I love, love, love...” and it is what Augustine meant by saying “I loved to love”. This is rhetoric figure of the paradox. The final judgment: “I do not love you”. Thesis becomes antithesis and that is the circle. It is the antinomian proposition.

DISCUSSION
The geometrization of the logical norm
“I love you” is a normal expression. “I love you” is a sentence involving names and relations between them. The form of this relation is the logical and geometric complex “I – You”, where “I” and “You” are names “a” and “b” (“a” is the name of “I” – “Augustine”, “b” is the name of “You”). The names in the sentence denote the things which are in relation to each other. The logical form of the complex is “aRb (Fig. 1). This relationship is the space relations. That’s what don’t happen to Augustine in Carthage.

Fig. 1. The vector of love emotions.
The geometrization of the antinomy

Logical conjunction: “I love love you” ∧ (“I love you”) = (“I do not love you”) (Fig. 2). From Wittgenstein’s point of view, this contradiction is impossible, if one of the sentences is considered as complete, i.e. as implemented in space \[ n \in \mathbb{N} \].

The geometrization of the paradox

In his doctrine of sin, Augustine says that the will of man deviates from the good – from the true object of love. Augustine recalls an episode of his youth when he stole pears. After he stole them, he threw them away. He didn’t need them. What was the purpose? The theft itself! “I did not then love anything else but the theft; yea rather I did love nothing else. <…> It was the sport, which as it were tickled our hearts, that we beguiled those who little thought what we were doing, and much disliked it” [3]. Speaking of love, Augustine takes the next step. It’s not about stealing; it’s about the structure of the motive. The only difference is that in the case of pears crime of intent is obvious; in the case of love it is hidden.

\[ R = \frac{I \text{ love you}}{n(I \text{ love you})}; \text{ where } n = 1, 2, 3, \ldots \infty \]

This is not a line, but an area (Fig. 3): “To Carthage I came, where there sang all around me in my ears a cauldron of unholy loves” (see above).

The functional description

The functional description of these experiences includes the function which is the proper argument.

\[ F(x) = I \text{ love } (y) \]

\[ F(f(x)) I \text{ love } (\text{ love } (y)) \]

\[ F(F(f(x))) \ldots = I \text{ love } (\text{ love } (\text{ love } (y))) \ldots \]

In the “Tractatus Logico-philosophicus” (in German 1921, in English 1922; revised 1933, 1961) Wittgenstein is trying to solve...
the Russell’s paradox: “3.333. The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument; in that case there would be a proposition ‘F(F(fx))’, in which the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form φ(fx) and the outer one has the form ψ(φ(fx)). Only the letter ‘F’ is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of ‘F (F (f(x)))’ we write ‘(∃φ) F (φu).φu = Fu’” [4].

That disposes of F (F (f(x)))…. = I love (love (love (you)))… = f(x) = I love (you) = Const.

I love (love (love (you)))…. where ‘(love (love (love (you))))’ are only words.

But: “5.251. A function cannot be its own argument, whereas an operation can take one of its own results as its base” [5].

This means that the action must be completed [6]. The action should be a fact. In other words, according to Wittgenstein:

\[ F(x) = \text{I love (you)} \]
\[ F_1 (f(x)) = \text{I love (love (you))} \]
\[ F_2 (F_1 (f(x)))…. = \text{I love (love (love (love (you))))}…, \text{where } F \neq F_1 \neq F_2. \]

‘I love you’ – this is the fact.

‘I love you love you’ – this is the same fact.

Augustine’s rhetorical expression: ‘I loved to love’ = ‘I love, love, love…’ is not the fact, this is the act. The love that Augustine experienced in Carthage is not a fact, but many facts, and this is not love. Love breaks into facts.

In the “Tractatus” Wittgenstein wrote: “1. The world is all that is the case... 1.2. The world divides into facts... <...> 5.621. The world and life are one. 5.63. I am my world. (The microcosm.)” [7]. Having established the relationship between 1, 1.2 and 5.621, 5.63 can be said: “My world is all that is the case in my life. My world divides into facts”. Augustine is experiencing in Carthage the disintegration of his “I” – “Ego”.

Augustine writes about “hell breath of wanting”, considering it to be the will’s mutation, demonization and destruction.
It is necessary to divide the subject to come to next stage. So, we come to next formula “I love, love you”="I (1) love you+ I (2) love you" where “I (1)” is different to “I (2)”. The next stage comes from dividing the initial integrity. The division stays hidden, but Augustine insists that it is dramatic because the collective personality is created for the cost of disintegration of initial personality.

The key moment if soul division, when it’s reasonable part is considered to be the integrity of human abilities (main of them are will, memory, reason, emotions, mind). The division of the soul is the division of integrity. The disintegration is complete when the soul still possesses all these abilities but cannot unite then. Augustine’s rhetorical expression and paradox are intention of will. For Wittgenstein, experiences are associated with the antinomy of the structure of emotions [8] (Fig. 4).

Hans-Johann Glock visualized the psychological structures of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and critically commented on them: “The former category of undergoings (Erfahrungen) is divided into ‘sensations’ (Sinnesempfindungen), which have genuine duration, admit of simultaneous occurrence, degrees and qualitative mixtures, and inform us about the material world, and ‘images’, which do not and are subject to the will. Emotions are characterized by genuine duration and typical feelings. They are divided into directed emotional dispositions (e.g., loving or hating), undirected emotional dispositions (e.g., depression), undirected occurrent emotions (e.g., anxiety) and directed occurrent emotions (e.g., being enraged by an insult). This classification incorporates important insights, but is still inadequate. It fails to distinguish between sensations and perceptions, even though the former but, following Wittgenstein, not the latter

Fig.4. Glock H. “A Wittgenstein dictionary” [9].
have a location in the body. And its categories do not accommodate thinking, consciousness or volition. Although such defects might be overcome, there is a seemingly insuperable difficulty. Even if the domain of the psychological can be demarcated, psychological concepts will not form a neat Porphyrian tree, as long as they are characterized along different parameters” [9] (Fig. 4).

**Fig. 4** shows that this relationship is realized between directed and non-directed emotions within the disposition. This is not the paradox of the transition of love into hate, but the loss of an object.

\[ F(\xi) \neq \xi(\xi) \text{, but } F(\xi) = -\xi(\xi). \]

This is the transition of love or hate into depression.

In the “Remarks on the foundations of mathematics” (1942) he again returns to the Russell’s paradox: “59. Why should Russell’s contradiction not be conceived as something supra-propositional, something that towers above the propositions and looks in both directions like a Janus head? N.B. the proposition \( F(F) \) - in which \( F(\xi) = \sim\xi(\xi) \)--contains no variables and so might hold as something supra-logical, as something unassailable, whose negation itself in turn only asserts it. Might one not even begin logic with this contradiction? And as it were descend from it to propositions. The proposition that contradicts itself would stand like a monument (with a Janus head) over the propositions of logic” [10]. For the description of this contradiction Wittgenstein proposes a kind of “transcendental function”: \( F(F) \), where \( F(\xi) = -\xi(\xi) \). It is “a shimmering concept”.

Function “\( F \)” is transferred into the brackets and back in a circle way (Fig. 5). Contradiction is part of logical symbolism, and according to Wittgenstein the logic is transcendental. The function \( F(f) \) can be called a “transcendental function”.

St Augustine writes his “Constitution” to the glory of God. “Great art Thou, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is Thy power, and Thy wisdom infinite” [12]. Wittgenstein also dedicated his first “Post–Tractatus” – “Philosophical remarks” – work to God (1929 – 1930): “I would like to say ‘This book is written to the glory of God’, but nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in good will, and in so far as it is not so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned. He cannot free it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them” [13]. In the epigraph to her,
he quotes St Augustine’s “Confession”: “Et multi ante nos vitam istam agentes, praestruxerant aerumnosas vias, per quas transire cogeberumur multipicato labore et dolore filiis Adam” [14] (“And many, passing the same course before us, framed for us weary paths, through which we were fain to pass; multiplying toil and grief upon the sons of Adam” [15]). Wittgenstein creates a philosophical grammar. It is the phenomenology of language: “A proposition is completely logically analyzed if its grammar is made clear—in no matter what idiom. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language—which amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language. Phenomenology as the grammar of those facts on which physics builds its theories” [16].

The grammar approach reverses the preceding analysis. At the heart of the love story in Carthage is a linguistic phenomenon F (f), “loved to love”. Love is not a feeling, but a class of feelings. “36. What sort of proposition is: “The class of lions is not a lion, but the class of classes is a class”? How is it verified? How could it be used?—As far as I can see, only as a grammatical proposition. To draw someone’s attention to the fact that the word “lion” is used in a fundamentally different way from the name of a lion; whereas the class word “class” is used like the designation of one of the classes, say the class lion” [17]. The experience of love will include the whole range of experiences of Augustine in Carthage, in the given fragment of the “Confessions”.

CONCLUSION
Wittgenstein makes an important note to the «Philosophical remarks» (1931): “The use of the words ‘fact’ and ‘act’.—’That was a noble act.’—’But, that never happened.’ It is natural to want to use the word ‘act’ so that it only corresponds to a true proposition. So that we then don’t talk of an act which was never performed. But the proposition ‘That was a noble act’ must still have a sense even if I am mistaken in thinking that what I call an act occurred. And that of itself contains all that matters, and I can only make the stipulation that I will only use the words ‘fact’, ‘act’ (perhaps also ‘event’) in a proposition which, when complete, asserts that this fact obtains. It would be better to drop the restriction on the use of these words, since it only leads to confusion, and say quite happily: ‘This act was never performed’, ‘This fact does not obtain’, ‘This event did not occur’. Complex is not like fact. For I can, e.g., say of a complex that it moves from one place to another, but not of a fact. But that this complex is now situated here is a fact. ‘This complex of buildings is coming down’ is tantamount to: ‘The buildings thus grouped together are coming down’. I call a flower, a house, a constellation, complexes: moreover, complexes of petals, bricks, stars, etc. That this constellation is located here, can of course be described by a proposition in which only its stars are mentioned and neither the word ‘constellation’ nor its name occurs. But that is all there is to say about the relation between complex and fact. And a complex is a spatial object, composed of spatial objects. (The concept ‘spatial’ admitting of a certain extension.)” [18]. “I loved to love” is an action that cannot be completed, but it can be localized in the future.

In the “Remarks on the philosophy of psychology” Wittgenstein wrote: “08. My super-ego might say of my ego: ‘It is raining, and the ego believes so,’ and might go on ‘So I shall probably take an umbrella
with me.' And now how does this game go on? "[19].

Saying “it is raining” and saying “I love you” are different things.

Saying “the rain is coming” and “the love is coming” means to speak not about the fact, but about the complex.

Both statements can be answered in the same way: “It seems so to you."

This answer emphasizes that this is about the same thing, about waiting for rain or love. The experience of the complex is different from the experience of the fact: one can apparently say that the experience of the complex is the experience of emotion, and the experience of the fact is the experience of event. The experience of emotion has duration, but no place. To believe in the approach of rain is to experience the event of the future in the present. The experience of the fact is the experience of a spatial event that is completed.

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